Libyans must speak before voting Reviews

On December 22, two days before the Libyan presidential election, the polling station announced a postponement of the vote. The Supreme National Electoral Commission (HNEC) suggested January 24, 2022, as the new date for the election, after the parliamentary committee in charge of overseeing the election deemed it “impossible” to do so as planned on December 24.

However, so far there is no agreement on the new date or election procedures, or whether the presidential and parliamentary elections should be held on the same day. But the lack of consensus on these logistical issues is by no means the biggest problem.

There are major unresolved issues polarizing the country right now, and unless there is an open dialogue to resolve them, holding elections on January 24 or any other future date risks plunging the country into a new cycle of violence.

Past election disputes

Holding elections amid heavy political polarization has already been a disaster for peace in Libya. After the ouster of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libyan actors and foreign actors went to the polls to begin the country’s political transition. But instead of bringing stability, the polls only exacerbated political and social tensions, which led to repeated episodes of deadly violence.

On July 7, 2012, Libya held its first parliamentary vote since the fall of the Gaddafi regime to elect a 200-member General Assembly (CNG). Although the great Western powers and the UN called it “free and fair,” the election did not bring stability to the country.

Great social and political unrest was not resolved and this caused unrest before and after the vote. Old complaints from the eastern and southern regions resurfaced, as their residents saw it as a sign that the unbalanced geographical distribution of seats would continue in Tripoli’s marginalization in post-Gaddafi Libya as well.

Moreover, local political actors wanted to weaken the GNC. Prior to the vote, the legislature was stripped of its key powers, such as appointing a committee to draft the constitution and discussing its provisions. Thus was born the weak GNC based in Tripoli, which suffered from limited powers and a lack of legitimacy. The cabinet he chose was also weakened.

This allowed malicious political actors to take advantage of inter-regional tensions for their political gain. In February 2014, General Khalifa Haftar, a senior Gaddafi army officer who launched an offensive against him, launched Operation Dignity, demanding that the Libyans rebel against the GNC. In May, his forces attacked the GNC building in Tripoli and launched an attack on armed groups in Benghazi.

With the end of his term and the country’s entry into the war, the GNC forced him to schedule new parliamentary elections in June. Between violence and low turnout, the House of Representatives was elected. Many members of the GNC, especially Westerners, opposed the results and refused to hand over the legislature to the new body. Forces loyal to the GNC prevented the newly elected deputies from starting work. In November, the Libyan Supreme Court ruled that the June 25 elections were unconstitutional, but the UN House of Representatives, which received UN recognition, disregarded the ruling.

Thus, at the end of the year, the country was divided between two camps: the General National Congress in Tripoli, which served as the executive, and which was eventually replaced by the UN-approved National Accord Government (GNA) in 2015. and the House of Representatives, which moved from the capital to the eastern port city of Tobruk.

One of the main reasons why the country did not run in the elections was the lack of agreement between the various Libyan political actors and their commitment to the basic political principles of the democratic transition. Prior to these votes, there was no guarantee that all parties would accept the final results and ensure that they were complied with. No significant measures were taken to resolve the historical grievances of the marginalized groups and to safeguard their representation in the new state institutions. There was also no proper reconciliation between the communities and tribes involved in past violence.

The absence of these important elements of the transition process led to its final sinking. Gradually, the division of legitimacy and representation of the state led the country into a civil war between enemy encampments aided by regional agents.

It took the international community and Libyan civilian forces several years to begin the transition process. In 2020, a ceasefire was negotiated to put an end to the mere Haftar attack in Tripoli. The Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) was then launched, with the support of the UN Libyan Mission (UNSMI) and regional and international actors such as Egypt, Turkey, Russia, France, the USA and Italy, each with their own interests. Libya.

In 2021, the National Union Government (GNU) was formed as a provisional body to advance the country’s political process, and presidential elections were scheduled for December 24. Although initially approved by GNU, the House of Representatives eventually rejected it. -Vote confidence in September.

Continuous polarization

Before the vote, it was clear that the old divisions continue to weaken and weaken the transition. There have been several marriage points that reflect the widespread polarization of Libya and have weakened the electoral process.

First, the law, which specified the electoral procedures, and the post-election institutional arrangement, was not approved by all parties. The provisions of the law were written and approved by the House of Representatives, which did not consult properly with other Libyan state bodies, such as the GNU, the Presidential Council, and the Supreme Council of State (HSC).

The law also established the Libyan political system as a presidency, giving the presidency significant powers. The provisions of the law also allow current incumbents to stand for election and then return to office if they lose.

Secondly, no consensus candidate was presented who could unite the divided Libya ahead of the election. In fact, the front of the race was a divisive figure. These include: GNU Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, who decided to present himself despite his refusal; Aguila Saleh, Speaker of the House of Representatives and a close ally of Haftar; Haftar bera; and, finally, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, one of Gaddafi’s sons, who is accused of crimes against humanity and is being sought by the International Criminal Court and the Attorney General of Tripoli.

Saif al-Islam’s candidacy, in particular, has caused outrage among Libyans, who are appalled that elections to return the country to a path of democratic transition could overthrow Gaddafi’s regime. While this is the most controversial of all, the rest is quite problematic. It is clear that they all want to present themselves in order to regain or protect their positions and privileges and that they will not be able to calm tensions, unite the country and gain the approval of all actors in the region.

Third, as in 2012 and 2014, there seems to be no consensus on “rules of the game” before the presidential vote. Leading political actors, backed by various armed groups, have clearly disagreed over what will happen after the election, how the transfer of power will take place and how the results will be accepted by all.

Moreover, there is no neutral security force or united army that can guarantee the peace of the vote, there is no neutral judicial system that can deal with litigation, and there is no independent media that keeps the Libyan people properly informed. Most importantly, there is no reconciliation between Libyans, as old and new complaints continue to escalate and many communities continue to face marginalization.

The way forward

The UN, along with the international community, has tried to turn a blind eye to the internal divisions between Libya’s main actors and has encouraged Libyans to hold elections at all costs, as they have done in the past, to the detriment of the nation.

Clearly, holding elections in these relatively similar situations to 2012 and 2014, if not worse, will not lead to peace and stability in Libya. Therefore, delaying the vote should be seen as an opportunity to shift the country to another cycle of violence.

To put Libya back on a peaceful path of transition, the country needs a new national dialogue with the support of the UN and the international community. It should bring together all Libyan actors, including civil society, representatives of ethnic minorities (such as Amazigh and Thebes), marginalized areas (such as Fezza) and excluded groups (such as women and youth) and the establishment of consensus on the electoral process. legislation, transfer of power and distribution of power between state institutions.

Leading political actors should publicly express their commitment to the electoral process, commit to respecting the end results, and be prepared to relinquish power. The talks should also pave the way for other critical issues during the transition period, such as the drafting of a new constitution, the unification of state institutions, especially the military, and security sector reform and reconciliation between Libyans.

A decade after the fall of the Gaddafi regime, it is time for Libya and its international partners to learn from the mistakes of the past. The Libyan rush to hold more elections will lead to more instability and violence amid heavy polarization and fierce complaints. Libya has the capacity to emerge from the failed state of affairs, but it needs the support of the international community to conduct a national dialogue and move forward on the path to peace and reconciliation.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial attitude of Al Jazeera.