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On November 30, the Iraqi Election Commission finally announced the results of the October 10 legislative elections. He confirmed that the political bloc of the Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr had won 73 of the 329 seats in parliament, and thus emerged as the winner of the election. Meanwhile, his rival, the Shia al-Fatah alliance, which is affiliated with the Iranian-backed People’s Mobilization Forces (PMF) militia, lost his seat in the vote and decided to reject the results.
These tensions within the Shiite political elite have opened the door to a new political arrangement in which Iraq’s main Kurdish parties could play a major role. Sadr has already stated that he will not deal with some al-Fatah groups and with former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s rule of law party, and will instead seek a “national majority government” through an agreement with the main Sunnis and Kurds. political forces.
If Sadr’s efforts succeed in creating a stable government, he can strengthen the Kurdish hand in Iraqi politics and help resolve the long-running conflicts between Baghdad and Iraqi Kurdistan Central Autonomous Region (KRI). Such a positive result, however, would depend on the ability of the main Kurdish parties to maintain a united front in the talks, which would lead to internal divisions and overcoming competition.
Tensions between the Kurds
Since the early 1990s, the Kurdish region of Iraq has been governed by a power-sharing agreement between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Kurdistan National Union (PUK), under the leadership of both peshmerga forces loyal to them. In recent years, however, the PUK has been losing ground to the KDP and the newly formed parties, which has weakened the organization. In fact, the October elections further upset the balance of power in favor of the KDP.
Of the 63 seats the Kurdish party has won in the new parliament, 31 have the KDP and only 18 the PUK. In a significant development, the KDP managed to win 2 seats in each PUK center: Kirkuk and Sulaimaniyah.
These results will have a significant impact on relations between the two sides, especially when it comes to finding consensus candidates for the Iraqi presidency and the governor of Kirkuk.
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, after the US invasion, Iraq’s presidency has been assigned to a representative of the Kurdish community through a power-sharing agreement with Sunnis and Shiites. And then another organization at the same time between the KDP and the PUK gave the latter the right to choose a candidate in exchange for the KRI presidency joining the KDP figure.
Until 2017, a consensus was reached between parties similar to the Kirkuk governor that a Kurd had. Although Kirkuk is part of the “conflict territory”, it has had a significant Kurdish population but is not part of the KRI. it has traditionally been seen as falling within the sphere of influence of the PUK, given that many of its leaders are provincial.
But the KDP no longer sees any reason to pay attention to past agreements, especially because it perceives that powerful PUK leaders betrayed Kurdish independence after the 2017 Kurdish independence referendum when the PUK left Peshmerga Kirkuk, like Shiite militias sent by Baghdad. he advanced to “punish” the Kurdish leader. The Iraqi government has appointed a new Arab governor.
The KDP now wants the floor on the appointment of the new president and the new governor of Kirkuk. The basic PUK, on the other hand, believes that it still has the military power to resist any attack on its interests.
In February 2019, the KDP and PUK reached an agreement to appoint a new Kurdish governor, but it has not yet been implemented for two reasons. First, the conflict between PUK leader Lahur Talabani and KDP leader Masoud Barzani has prevented the two parties from reaching a consensus agreement. Second, the continued presence of Shiite pro-Iranian militias in the province and Baghdad’s refusal to appoint a new governor are also major challenges.
However, recent changes in the PUK may increase the possibility of convergence between the two Kurdish parties. Both the KDP leadership and the current PUK leadership have joined forces in the opposition Lahur Talabani, who was ousted as president of the PUK in July this year.
In early November, the PUK Political Bureau reaffirmed its expulsion from the party, paving the way for Bafel Talabani, another PUK president, to officially abolish the presidential presidency and take over the party. This could open the door to a broader agreement with the KDP in Kirkuk, the Iraqi presidency, and other prominent issues.
Opportunity for Kurds
In the October 10 elections, Kurdish parties raised their seats in the Iraqi parliament from 58 to 63. Sunni factions have a total of about 70 seats, but unlike the Kurdish parties, they do not have as much power on the ground and do not present themselves directly. Sunni regions. Therefore, the Kurds have a greater capacity to play the role of royal author.
In a “national majority government” with a composition that Sadr envisages, Kurdish parties would be able to increase their number of seats, rather than move from being part of the Iraqi cabinet to a real decision-maker.
In addition to raising the bar for negotiating government positions, better election performance by Kurdish parties could also help them negotiate with Baghdad on a number of thorny issues.
First, there is the issue of budget allocation and the distribution of oil profits. In 2014, amid tensions between then-KRI President Masoud Barzani and former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Baghdad decided to suspend the allocation of the Kurdish part of its national budget and accused Erbili of failing to provide the agreed amount of oil to the State Marketing Agency. Of oil.
Since then, several agreements have been signed, but they have not resolved the issue. In June this year, Baghdad and Erbil reached a new agreement, with the former sending $ 200 billion ($ 137 million) a month to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). However, this agreement only applies to this year’s budget, so the Kurdish parties will have the opportunity to renegotiate the talks to form a government.
Secondly, there is the issue of “disputed territories”, which include Kirkuk province and more than a dozen districts in Nineveh, Diyala and Salahaddin provinces. The situation in these areas was to be fixed by the KRI and Baghdad in 2005 after the proclamation of the Iraqi constitution, but this never happened. In the fight against ISIS, KRI peshmerga forces were able to control some of these areas, but after the referendum, they were forced to retreat.
Since then, administrative, security and political cooperation between Baghdad and Erbil has been very limited in these areas, and pro-Iran armed groups have dominated the security landscape.
In the October elections, Kurdish parties performed fairly well in these areas, and won five new seats in the disputed territories of Nineveh, Salahaddin and Diyala provinces.
The Kurdish party now has six of its 12 seats in Kirkuk and 11 of its 31 seats in Nineveh. Increasing Kurdish political representation in these areas could help in negotiations over their status. What the KRG can assure in realism is the approval of Baghdad to appoint the Kurdish governor of Kirkuk and the joint security administration in the disputed territories.
Increasing ISIS activity in these areas makes this security coordination even more necessary, but this should lead to some sort of solution with the Iranian militias currently deployed in these areas. This could be difficult if Sadr did not change his mind about isolating al-Fateh and other Shiite factions.
In any case, “national majority government” could be an important opportunity for KRI leadership to make significant gains. But if they do not unite in the best interests of the Kurdish community, their failure can lead to their persecution.
Like most other traditional political forces, the main Kurdish parties have declined support. Although the KDP increased its parliamentary presence by eight seats, the number of votes it received fell by more than 100,000 in the KRI provinces compared to the 2018 elections. A new party, the New Generation, attracted the votes of many inappropriate Kurds, gaining nine seats. This, along with protests over the past four years in the KRI, reflects growing dissent from Kurdish leaders in Iraq.
If the traditional leadership of the Kurds does not make a big profit for its people from the advantageous position it finds at the moment, another angry people may soon appear.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial attitude of Al Jazeera.
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