[ad_1]
June 5 marks four years since Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Egypt imposed a blockade on Qatar and five months since the summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council in Saudi Arabia’s Al-Ula, which marked the end of the deepest. the rift in the history of the organization. The ways in which the 43-month blockade began and ended have reflected broader changes in regional and international perspectives since 2017.
Therefore, it is important to examine what lessons have been learned over the last four years, whether the agreement signed in Al-Ulan is permanent and how the reconciliation process is going.
From beginning to end, the blockade of Qatar was a textbook on the crisis in the region during the time of US President Donald Trump and the weakening of the international order based on rules. Power games designed to isolate Qatar politically and economically began with the hacking of the Qatar News Agency and the fake news that Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani intended to denounce the fiery comments of the Qatar Emirate was planted. This formed a chain of events following the real manifestation of the crisis rooted in the notion of “alternative events,” a term coined in January 2017 by Trump’s then-Kellyanne Conway, then chief adviser.
The blockade also followed a pattern of outreach to the upcoming Trump administration by Emirati and Saudi officials, beginning with a visit to New York by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed in Abu Dhabi in December 2016 to meet with members of the transition group. Trump traveled abroad for his first presidency to Riyadh in May 2017. During this period, it seems that the interactions were intended to attract the transactional and unconventional style of decision-making in the White House, creating and increasing the campaign of influence that Qatar considers negative. actor in regional affairs.
This view bore fruit because Trump surprised observers, including secretaries of state and defense, by initiating the blockade and linking his decision against Qatar to talks in Riyadh two weeks earlier. Trump’s statement threatened to raise the backbone of Qatar’s security and defense cooperation with the U.S. and boost hopes in blocking the capitals that could lead Trump to a pro-conflict approach to the deal.
In retrospect, it was wrong for the rest of the U.S. government to follow up on the White House in taking over the parties, and Trump eventually pushed back Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Secretary of Defense James Mattis and U.S. military leaders. change attitude.
It is not clear whether officials from the blocking states, including some who were very skilled in U.S. politics, would have thought otherwise. One possibility is that the Trump administration, loudly proclaiming its intention to do things out loud in the office in its own way, encouraged them to believe that whatever the limit and established procedure of the rules meant, it also meant what friends and opponents said.
By September 2017, the blockade was set in a holding pattern that lasted for the rest of Trump’s tumultuous presidency. Kuwait Emir Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah’s visit to the White House that month was notable because of Emir Sabah’s comment that “the important thing is that we have stopped military action,” but attempts by Kuwait and the U.S. to mediate impasse. On at least two occasions, in December 2019 and July 2020, expectations of a breakthrough in relations with Saudi Qatar were dashed, with the difficulty of resolving the conflict involving two parties rather than the five parties.
What made Al-Ulan a breakthrough in January 2021 was that in 2019 and 2020, both regionally and internationally, there were several developments. Qatar, meanwhile, tweeted in favor of blocking Trump in June 2017 (temporarily) questioning the reliability of U.S. cooperation, with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi as their “moment of truth” arrived between May and September 2019. When the Trump administration failed to respond to attacks on maritime and energy targets in and around Saudi Arabia. and the BAC ended up publicly separating US and Saudi Arabian interests after attacks by missiles and drones against oil facilities in Saudi Arabia.
The 2019 attacks, linked to Iran, eroded the assertiveness of the regions to pursue policies in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, as well as what they had seen with Iran in particular, that their interests and those of the US were of the same effectiveness. Leaders of the Emirate and Saudi Arabia began directing Iran, directly and indirectly, to explore ways to increase tensions, and the Qatari leadership responded to Abqaiq’s September 2019 attack by reaffirming the GCC collective’s security principle. If nothing else, the 2019 attacks proved that, for all differences of perspective, Doha was not the first threat to regional security and stability in 2017, nor even more important.
A year later, when Trump failed to overturn the results of the 2020 presidential election, Gulf leaders had the opportunity in January 2021 for the Biden administration to take office. During the campaign, Biden and others in his group expressed skepticism about the region, and especially the reliability of Saudi Arabia and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman as responsible partners. So it was no surprise that the transition from Trump to Biden was likely to end a blockade that would never have happened under another president and put Saudi officials at the center and center of Mohammed bin Salman’s reconciliation summit, portraying him as regional head of state for the past four years. draws a line.
Although the exact details of the Al-Ula agreement have not been disclosed, there are reasons for cautious optimism that the reconciliation process is more sustainable than it was after the signing of the Riyadh Agreement, which ended diplomacy in 2014, following the rupture in 2017. In particular, follow-up meetings have taken place between Qatar and the Emirates, as well as between the delegations of Qatar and Egypt, and subsequent rounds of dialogue have been held to address issues of concern.
This suggests that the Al-Ula Accord, unlike the Riyadh Agreement, is not a one-time document, but rather part of a deeper process of re-participation in specific bilateral routes that would allow parties to press deeper than a generic one. -size-fits-all ”agreement. Moreover, the declaration that the issues can be bridged and not taken “take or leave” as an ultimatum indicates 13 requests made by the blocking states in June 2017, which had no basis for fruitful negotiation.
It seems that the flexibility is recognized that relations between Qatar and the blocking states will not progress at the same speed or depth. Already, there are relations that have improved faster and farther with Saudi Arabia and (to a lesser extent) Egypt, which probably reflects a large part of the original despair of the blockade that did not originate in Riyadh or Cairo. Along with other GCC leaders, Qatar leadership appeared in favor of the crown prince in February after the release of CIA findings related to the 2018 assassination of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi and reaffirmed the importance of a stable Saudi Arabia in regional security. Gulf. Emir Tamim visited Mohammed bin Salman in Jeddan on May 10 and ties at all levels seem to have been fully restored.
The blockade of Qatar was the longest rift in GCC history, marking its 40th anniversary on May 25 and, unlike in previous times of tension, its influence was not limited to the level of leaders and politicians in politics, it encompassed entire nations. It may take more time to repair the damage done to the social fabric of the “Gulf House” and memories of the bitterness and anger on social media and social media platforms could occur. For now and in the near future, however, all parties to the blockade will establish a modus vivendi at least until the regional or international context changes again.
[ad_2]
Source link
