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Iran-backed PMFs are destabilizing Iraq’s conflict regions In the Middle East

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On April 15, an explosive-laden drone targeted U.S. military installations in Erbil, the capital of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (KRI), but caused no casualties. On the same day, a rocket fired at a Turkish military base in the Bashiqa region of Mosul killed a Turkish soldier.

Attacks on pro-Iranian factions based in Iraq have been widely seen in the region in the context of the US-Iran and Turkey-Iran clashes. However, this analysis highlights an important development related to these events: the attempt to consolidate the conflict between the Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in the territories of northern Iraqi-backed paramilitaries in northern Iraq.

The presence and growing strength of these groups have profound implications not only for the future of Baghdad-Erbil relations, but also for inter-ethnic and inter-ethnic multi-regional communities. Since their arrival, Iranian-backed paramilitaries have transformed the nature of the conflict over these territories from a two-government conflict to a very complex one, with deep militarization of the ethno-religious and sectarian identities of the Nineveh and Kirkuk governments.

Militarization of ethno-religious and sectarian groups

The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 allowed Iran to massively expand its influence on its neighbor’s internal problems. In addition to developing a network of supporters within civilian power structures, Iran trained and armed numerous paramilitaries, including the Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Hezbollah, and Saraya al-Khorasani.

When ISIS spread into Iraqi territory in 2014 and with Ali Fat al-Sistani the Great Ayatollah, along with fatware to launch a popular mobilization by Iraq’s largest Shiite religious authorities, these armed groups Hashd al-Shaabi (People’s Mobilization Forces, PMFs). They led the fight against ISIS and had quite a reputation.

The PMF arrived in the northern suburbs in October 2017, when they, along with regular Iraqi forces, attacked the Kurdish Peshmerga after an independence referendum conducted by the KRG. Although initially under Baghdad, Iran-backed PMFs have since achieved their political and military goals.

Armed groups in favor of Iran have sought to establish Nineveh and Kirkuk forever, thus expanding Tehran’s military reach over Iraqi territory. By recruiting fighters from local communities and creating new factions, the PMF has militarized and politicized ethno-religious and sectarian identities.

In the Hamdaniah, Telkaif and Bashiqa districts of Nineveh, a 30th brigade was formed, led by members of the Shabak community, an ethnic and religious minority that followed the Twelver Shia-ism. They also formed the 53rd Brigade for the Shiites in Turkey in Telafar, which includes a Yazidi Lalish unit from Sinaz to Yazidi. They also created the 50th Assyrian Brigade in the Hamdaniah district.

In the western province of Nineveh in Sinjar, pro-Iranian PMF factions have also supported the Sinjar Resistance Units, which were formed in the fight against ISIS and were initially supplied and trained by the Kurdistan Workers ’Party (PKK). In 2018 they formally joined the PMF’s al-Nasr al-Mubeen brigade.

In the Kirkuk provinces, there has been a similar proliferation of local armed groups. In the Taza district, Iranian-backed paramilitaries set up a 16th brigade by arming and training Turkish nationals. The 52nd Brigade has also hired very Turkish. Pro-Iranian PMFs have tried to form a faction for the Kaka’i community, the minimum Kurdish religion located in Daquq and Kirkuk, but have yet to be fully successful.

Other political and military forces, including the KRG, armed groups associated with the Shiite clergy Sistani and Muqtada al-Sadr, and some local Sunni politicians have also tried to establish and support their factions in the conflict territories.

In addition to gaining an impact on local communities through military presence and recruitment, pro-Iranian PMFs have expanded shadow administrations that build security, social, political, and economic structures, formally compete, and weaken them. In addition to controlling the movement of people and goods, they have been responsible for “taxing” local businesses. They have also been involved in religious issues, controlling Sunni religious sites and endowments, and supporting newly created Shiite endowments.

These activities by pro-Iran groups have exacerbated tensions within and between communities. For example, in the city of Kirkuk, Sunni Turks are more Sunni than Sunni, but support from the PMFs has encouraged Turkish Turks, who have been more politically assertive. This could lead to new ruptures within Turkmen as Shiites consolidate power in central Kirkuk. A similar dynamic is playing out among Turkmen in the Telafar district.

Among the Yazidis, the divisions within the community are also deepening. Areas affected by the pro-Iranian PMF and PKK have questioned the traditional power structures of the community. This was reflected in tensions over the election of a new Yazidi leader after the death of Tahsin Said Beg in 2019.

In July of that year, after deep discussion within the community, the Yazidis of Sheikh, backed by the Kurdistan Democratic Party, appointed their son, Hazim Tahsin Beg, as their new prince. In the face of this, the PKK and the PMF threatened something similar to secession affiliated with the Yazidis of Sinjar, vowing to appoint a leader of their choice.

Weakening government power

The dispute over the territories of Baghdad and the KRG returned to the process of drafting constitutions that began after the fall of the US regime in 2003 following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The constitution defined the boundaries of the semi-autonomous KRI, but Kirkuk left the state of the province and the numerous districts inhabited by the Kurdish communities of Nineveh, Salahaddin and Diyala unresolved. There were never any referendums to decide the fate of these disputed territories.

Over the years, this conflict has been compounded by a number of factors, including budget disagreements and persistent insecurity. The presence of Iran-backed PMFs, however, has put further tensions on the Baghdad-Erbil relationship and directly undermined efforts to move forward on this key issue.

When Adel Abdul Mahdi headed the Iraqi government in 2018, the impetus for resolving conflicts with the KRG was renewed. The central government negotiated with Erbil to create joint coordination centers in many areas of Kirkuk and Nineveh provinces. But Iran-backed PMFs tried to undermine those efforts.

In October 2019, the Iraqi Interior Ministry and the Peshmerga KRG Ministry reached a final agreement to create five joint coordination centers in Kirkuk, Mosul, Makhmour, Khanaqin and Kask. A few days later, the Interior Ministry, under the influence of the PMF, renounced the agreement. Under the current government of Mustafa al-Kadhimi, only two such centers have been set up in Baghdad and Erbil.

Iran-backed paramilitary groups also tried to sabotage the Sinbil Agreement, signed in October 2020 between Erbil and Baghdad with the support of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq. The agreement sought to launch the stabilization process in Sinjar by addressing two key issues: the presence of numerous armed actors and the opposition of two district administrations. But after seven months, no progress has been made in implementing the agreement.

Some have blamed the failure of the agreement on the lack of commitment and inclusion of all sectors of Sinjar and Yazidi society. It is true, however, that the main obstacle is the denial of the essence of the agreement by Iran-backed militias – the establishment of a monopoly on the use of government force – and the refusal to withdraw.

It is not in the interest of pro-Iranian groups that the KRG and the central government of Iraq re-establish control over Sinjar because they intend to lose it not only politically but also economically. The PMFs in Sinjar earn directly from cross-border smuggling by imposing a tax system on imports from Syria of animals, agricultural products and so on.

The latest attacks on U.S. and Turkish forces are likely the result of the intransigence of Iran-backed groups in the face of growing pressure to withdraw from the country’s north and west. There is also growing concern among them that their popularity is declining – it was revealed in popular protests against the 2019-2020 government in the southern Baghdad and majority Shia cities.

That is why Iran-backed PMFs are desperately looking for new enemies to justify their presence in the conflict zones before the US-allied KRG and Turkey and to continue to maintain the current security and power structure.

By undermining efforts to reach agreements and implement areas in conflict zones between Erbil and Baghdad, Iran-backed armed groups are preventing the restoration of strong civilian centers of power that could pave the way for the stabilization and reconstruction of these areas. This is in line with Iran’s overall strategy for Iraq – to maintain constant uncertainty, with weak state institutions and controls.

As long as the Iraqi government is unable to control these powerful out-of-state actors, it will not be able to focus the country on stability and socio-economic development. Their constant presence in emerging disputes is creating tensions that could lead to a renewed conflict in the near future.

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the Al Jazeera editorial.



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